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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - at  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that  such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of i t  stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal- all the way to the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to  pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
SUMMARY 
Firm-specific technological competencies are major factors explaining why firms are 
different, how they change over time, and whether or not they are capable of remaining 
competitive. Systematic analysis of the technological activities of more than 400 of the 
world's largest firms shows that their technological competencies have the following 
characteristics. 
They are highly diversified. Large firms are typically multi-technology. The most 
pervasive competencies remain in mechanical, chemical and instrumentation 
engineering, and with an increasing spread of competencies in computers, materials 
and biotechnology. 
They are highly stable and differentiated in composition, with both the technology 
mix and the directions of localised search strongly influenced by the firm's principal 
products. 
The rate of search (as measured by the level and rate of increase of total innovative 
activities, and by the rate of entry into fast-growing technical sub-fields) is influenced 
by both the firm's principal products, and the conditions in its home country. 
However, considerable unexplained variance suggests scope for managerial choice 
in the overall commitment of resources to the accumulation of technological 
competencies, and in the vigour with which promising sub-fields are explored. 
These findings: 
1. confirm the importance of complexity and path dependency in the accumulation of 
firm-specific technological competencies; 
2. demonstrate that technological competencies give a convincing empirical explanation 
of the boundaries (or - and perhaps better - the core activities) of firms. 
3 .  challenge many of the standard taxonomies of technology strategies in large firms. In 
particular: 
- firms' technological diversity challenges notions of "focus", "core competence", 
"competence-destroying innovations", and "technological leap-frogging"; 
- firms' differentiated competencies and path dependency put severe limits on the 
range of exploitable technological opportunities; 
- firms' stability in technology mix shows that technological accumulation and 
change are slow processes. 
4. confirm the importance in technology strategy of integration (or "fusion") of different 
fields of technological competence. 
5. point towards the importance of complementary managerial competencies in 
organisational integration, methods of resource allocation, and learning. 
Technological Competencies in the 
World's Largest Firms: 
Characteristics, Constraints and 
Scope for Managerial Choice 
Pari Patel and Keith Pavitt 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Why Firm-Specific Technological Competencies are Important 
The purpose of this paper is to throw empirical light on the nature and determinants of the 
technological competencies of the world's largest firms. The subject of "firm-specific 
competencies" is of increasing interest to practitioners, and to theorists - and particularly to 
those in the neo-Schumpeterian tradition, who are seeking to explain why firms provide 
different ranges of goods and services, why they change at different rates and in different 
directions over time, and what makes them competitive (Rumelt, 1974; Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Dosi et al., 1992; Carlsson and Eliasson, 1991; 
Teece et al., 1992, Teece et al., 1993). 
Our main data source is systematic information of US patenting by more than 400 of the 
world's largest technologically active firms, broken down by each firm's nationality 
(headquarters country) and principal product group, and by the technical field and by the 
country of origin of the inventor of each patent'. Similar data has been used by Hall and her 
colleagues (1986) to measure lags between R & D and patenting at the firm level, by Narin 
and his colleagues (1987, 1988) for corporate and competitor analysis, by Jaffe (1986, 1989) 
to identify and measure technological "spillovers", and by Cantwell (1991) to explain patterns 
of international production. 
I These firms have been chosen from the list of world's largest firms published in the Fortune magazine in 1988. 
Only firms with more than 50 patents granted in the US in  the period 1981-90 have been included. For a detailed 
description of the characteristics and method of compilation of the database see Patel and Pavitt (1991). 
1.2 The Main Questions and their Answers 
We concentrate here on systematic comparisons of the level, rates of change and composition 
(by technical field) of each firm's patenting activity, and on their characteristics and 
determinants. In this paper, our level of analysis is not detailed enough either to identify a 
specific company's distinctive competence within a product field, or to describe how it 
accumulates technology to gain competitive advantage2. Instead, we intend to answer two 
questions. 
First: "What are the characteristics of technological competencies in large firms?" We shall 
show that they are: 
diversified (i.e. multi-technology) and evolving over time; 
heavily differentiated and stable in their composition and their directions of search, 
both as a function of the products that they make. 
Second: "What are the constraints on the development of technological competencies in large 
firms, and what in consequence is the scope for managerial choice?" We shall show that: 
the rate of search is significantly influenced by both the firm's product mix and country 
of origin; 
there is considerable unexplained variance in the aggregate level of technological 
activity, and in the rate of entry into fast-growing technical sub-fields. 
This suggests that, whilst directions of search are heavily constrained by accumulated 
competencies, considerable scope for managerial choice remains in fixing the rate of search. 
1.3 The Framework of Explanation: Coping with Complexity 
Both our questions and our answers are consistent with the neo-Schumpeterian framework of 
analysis, based on the pioneering work of Nelson and Winter (1982)3. Technological 
artefacts, and the organisational and economic worlds in which they are embedded, are 
complex: in other words, they each comprise so many variables and interactions that it is 
impossible fully to model, predict and control their behaviour through explicit and codified 
theories and guidelines. Certainty about the future, probabilistic risk and optimisation are 
therefore impossible. The best approach to problem-solving and the management of change is 
step-by-step experimentation, in which changes are made in one feature or component at a 
For a recent example of the latter, see Miyazaki (1994), who used bibliometrics and interviews to trace how a 
number of major companies assimilated opto-electronics technologies. She found cumulative paths of learning: 
directions of search were influenced by previously accumulated competencies; and over time search became 
more focused and applied. 
See also Rumelt et al., 199 1. 
time, and ends and means re-interpreted in the light of the subsequently observed changes. In 
addition to codified knowledge, experience and tacit knowledge improve the effectiveness of: 
the choices of the feature or component to vary at each stage; 
subsequent modifications in means and ends made after observation of the effects of 
variations in features or components. 
This method is called "learning", or "experimentation", or "trial and error" (and many other 
things, including "suck it and see"). Essentially the same approach underlies Lindblom's 
prescriptions in public policy (1959), Quinn's in corporate strategy (1980), and Kline's in 
engineering design and development (1990). It explains our results, as follows: 
the complex and multivariate nature of technological artefacts requires the combination 
and application of advances in many fields of knowledge: hence large firms' 
competencies are typically multi-technology, and evolving over time; 
complexity also constrains firms to search and experiment in and around what they 
already know and produce: hence firms competencies are differentiated, stable, and 
closely related to their product mix; 
the rate and direction of a firm's search will be influenced by the opportunities and 
incentives that it faces. These will depend on its own accumulated competencies, and 
on its surrounding environment: hence the influence of both principal product group, 
and home country on firms' level of technological activities; 
but complexity means uncertainty, and the impossibility for a firm to identify all 
possible future states, let alone to predict what will happen. It also means difficulty 
and uncertainty in identifying the competitive competencies that the firm has at its 
disposal. Hence the unexplained variance in the level of technological activities and 
in the rate of entry in fast-growing sub-fields, reflecting the scope for managerial 
choice. 
1.4 Limitations of our Analysis 
Our paper has three sets of limitations. First, we measure only technological competence, and 
thereby neglect many others that are important. Dosi and Teece(1993) have distinguished 
organisational-economic competencies from technical competencies, and have argued that the 
latter derives from the former, and is therefore more fundamental to the firm4. Our empirical 
"Organisational/economic competence involves: (1) allocative competence - deciding what to produce and 
how to price it; (2) transactional competence - deciding whether to make or buy, and whether to do so alone or 
in partnership; and (3) administrative competence - how to design organisational structures and policies to 
enable efficient performance. Technical competence, on the other hand, includes the ability to develop and 
design products and processes, and to operate facilities effectively ..................... A firm becomes superior in a 
results suggest that this is only partly correct. A firm's organisational competence does 
influence its level of commitment to technological activities, and its rate of entry into fast- 
growing sub-fields. However, a firm's accumulated technological competence strongly 
constrains the directions in which it searches: even the brightest and the best organisational 
capabilities will find it difficult (impossible?) to convert a firm making Harris Tweed jackets, 
or Italian high-fashion shoes, into a world class firm in personal computers. The 
differentiated nature of technical competencies is one the most important factors explaining 
the coherence and the boundaries of the firm. And a recent survey of 100 Italian firms by 
Malerba and Marengo (1993), ranked technological competencies as of greater long term 
importance than competencies to respond to either market signals or competitors' strategic 
actions. The subject therefore deserves analytical and empirical attention, even if it does not 
cover - and cannot explain - everythings. 
The second limitation is that we measure technological competencies only imperfectly 
through patent data6. Nonetheless, patenting in the USA is a better measure than most, if not 
all, the alternatives given its relative homogeneity, detail, accuracy and (after recent advances 
in information technology) accessibility and cost: hence its increasing use by both analysts 
and practitioners7. However, in relation to the subject of this paper, three potential limitations 
of the US patenting measure must be mentioned: 
1. Patents do not measure the extent of the firm's external technological linkages. 
However, many studies have shown (most notably, Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) that 
external technological linkages are in general complementary to internal competencies, 
and these we do measure. 
2. Patents measure codified knowledge, whereas a high proportion of firm-specific 
competencies is non-codified (i.e. tacit) knowledge. We would argue that the two 
forms of knowledge are complementary, not substitutes. Other measures that embody 
tacit knowledge (such as R & D expenditure, judgements of technological peers) give 
results very similar to those using patenting (see Pate1 and Pavitt, 1987). 
particular technological domain because it has certain organisational capabilities: it allocates resources to more 
promising projects, it harnesses experience from prior projects, it hires and upgrades human resources, it 
integrates new findings from external sources, and it manages a set of problem-solving activities associated with 
that technology." (Dosi and Teece, 1993, pp. 6-7). 
In a similar manner (and using the jargon of another academic discipline), we are fully aware that 
technological competencies in large firms are "socially constructed (Hughes and Pinch, 1987). But we 
concentrate here on the important cognitive factors that shape the social construction of technology. 
The uses and abuses of patent data have been extensively discussed elsewhere, See, for example, Basberg, 
1987; Pavitt, 1988; Grilliches, 1990; Patel and Pavitt, 1994a. 
In addition to Jaffe (1986, 1989) and Narin And Noma (1988) see - for example - Griliches (1984) and 
Business Week, (1 993). 
3. Patenting does not fully measure competencies in software technology, since copyright 
law is often used instead as the main means of protection against imitation (see Barton, 
1993; Samuelson, 1993). We readily admit this to be the major empirical shortcoming 
of our analysis, and plead only that no-one has yet found a satisfactory, accessible and 
systematic measure of competencies in software technology that we could uses. And 
as we shall see in section 2 below, we have nonetheless been able to identify the 
growing importance of competencies in information technology. 
The third limitation to our analysis is that we do not assess how differences in the rate and 
direction of technological accumulation affect firms' economic and competitive performance. 
Suffice to say that a growing number of studies confirm the competitive importance of 
technological competencies at the level of the firmg, which should in principle heighten 
interest in studies like ours that attempt to describe and explain how they are acquired. 
1.5 Structure 
We shall now describe the key characteristics of large firms' technological competencies that 
emerge from our analysis: diversity in section 2, differentiation and stability in section 3, and 
the influence of sector, country and management in section 4. In section 5, we draw 
conclusions for practice and for theory. 
2 TECHNOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: 
THE PREVALENCE OF THE "MULTI-TECHNOLOGY" FIRM 
2.1 The Extent of Technological Diversity 
The most striking feature of the technological competencies of large firms is the diversity of 
technological fields in which they are active. This is shown most simply in Table 1, which 
gives the distribution of US patenting of our large firms, in each of the 16 principal product 
groups, across four major technological families: chemical, electrical+lectronic, non- 
electrical machinery and transport, as well as a residual category labelled 'other'lo. Firms 
have substantial technological competencies outside what would appear to be their core areas. 
Thus, both electrical and chemical firms have about two-thirds of their competencies in their 
obvious core areas, but each has 15% or more in non-electrical machinery: and automobile 
Recent research by Jacobsson and Oskarsson (1994) uses very interesting data on the technical field of 
specialisation of Swedish engineers working in Swedish firms. Unfortunately, this method cannot easily be 
reproduced in other countries, because of lack of data. 
See, for example, Cantwell (1989). Franko (1989), Geroski et al., (1993), Oskarsson (1993). 
lo The method for distributing firms' technological activities amongst four technological families is described 
more fully in Patel and Pavitt (1994b). Briefly stated we re-classified the US Patent Classes and sub-classes 
into 34 technical fields, and 91 sub-fields. On the basis of the 91 sub-fields, we re-combined patenting into the 
four technological families shown in Table 1. The "Other" category includes traditional manufacturing (e.g. 
textiles) and non-manufacturing (e.g. construction, medicine, agriculture). 
firms have less than a third of their competencies in transport technologies, but more than 
45% in non-electrical machinery. Only firms principally in pharmaceuticals have less than 
10% on average of their technological competencies in non-electrical machinery. 
Table 1. The Distribution of Large Firms' Technological Activities in Five Broad 
Technological Fields, according to their Principal Product Group: 1981-90. 
Percentage share of the PPG's patents in technology field 
Non- 
Principal Product Group Electrical 
(PPG) Chemical Machinery Electrical Transport Other Total 
Chemicals 7 1 .O 16.9 8.9 0.6 2.6 100.0 
Pharmaceuticals 80.2 8 .O 2.1 0.0 9.7 100.0 
Mining & Petroleum 57.1 34.2 6.7 0.9 1.1 100.0 
Textiles etc. 52.9 3 1.7 9.5 0.6 5.3 100.0 
Rubber & Plastics 43.2 29.3 4.7 20.1 2.7 100.0 
Paper & Wood 25.4 47.1 12.4 0.4 14.6 100.0 
Food 70.6 21.9 3.0 0.1 4.3 100.0 
Drink & Tobacco 40.8 50.3 4.6 0.3 3.9 100.0 
Building Materials 30.5 5 1.3 10.0 0.9 7.3 100.0 
Metals 26.8 54.9 13.9 2.1 2.2 100.0 
Machinery 7.6 64.9 13.9 10.2 3.3 100.0 
Electrical 7.6 21.2 67.0 1.3 2.8 100.0 
Computers 5.2 16.3 77.3 0.2 1.0 100.0 
Instruments 14.3 18.3 64.2 0.1 3.0 100.0 
Motor Vehicles 3.8 44.8 20.7 28.8 1.9 100.0 
Aircraft 8.1 48.5 31.2 8.3 3.9 100.0 
All 440 Large Firms 28.8 27.9 35.7 4.4 3.1 100.0 
Source: Calculated from data supplied to SPRU by the US Patent and Trademark Office. 
Another measure of technological diversity is the number of technical fields - out of the total 
of 34 used in our analysisl1 - in which our firms have been granted a patent and are therefore 
technically competent. Table 2 confirms this diversity: only 4% of our firms were active 
sometime in the 1980s in 10 or fewer of these technical fields, whist 52% were active in 
between 10 and 20, and 44% in more than 20 - hence the term "multi-technology" firm (See 
Archibugi, 1988; and Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990)'2. 
' See Table 5 for the name of each of the technical fields. 
l 2  The distribution of our firms amongst the different degrees of technological diversity shown in Table 2 is 
sensitive to the measure of technological competence chosen. Thus, when it is increased from one to ten patents 
in the 1980s. the proportion of firms active in more than 10 technical fields declines from more than 95% to just 
over 30%. However, as we shall show in section 3, apparently low-level technological activity is an important 
and permanent feature of firm-specific technological competencies. And other measures confirm large firms' 
technological diversity. For example, 90% of total technological activity is concentrated in five or fewer 
technical fields in 14 % of our firms, whilst 64% reach this threshold at between 6 and 10 fields, and 20% with 
more than 10 fields. 
Table 2. Number of Technical Fields (out of 34) in which Firms have one Patent or 
more in 1981-90: Percentage Distribution. 
Product Group Number of Less than Greater Greater Greater Total 
firms or equal to than 10 but than 20 but than 30 
10 less than or less than or 
equal to 20 equal to 30 
Chemicals 66 4.5 39.4 50.0 6.1 100.00 
Pharmaceuticals 25 12.0 56.0 32.0 0.0 100.00 
Mining & Petroleum 3 1 0.0 48.4 38.7 12.9 100.00 
Textiles etc. 10 10.0 80.0 10.0 0.0 100.00 
Rubber & Plastics 9 0.0 77.8 22.2 0.0 100.00 
Paper & Wood 18 5.6 83.3 11.1 0.0 100.00 
Food 14 42.9 42.9 14.3 0.0 100.00 
Drink & Tobacco 8 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.00 
Building Materials 16 0.0 56.3 43.8 0.0 100.00 
Metals 3 8 0.0 57.9 42.1 0.0 100.00 
Machinery 5 8 1.7 67.2 31.0 0.0 100.00 
Electrical 5 6 0.0 37.5 48.2 14.3 100.00 
Computers 17 11.8 58.8 29.4 0.0 100.00 
Instruments 2 1 4.8 38.1 57.1 0.0 100.00 
Motor Vehicles 3 5 2.9 48.6 48.6 0.0 100.00 
Aircraft 18 0.0 22.2 77.8 0.0 100.00 
All Sectors 440 4.3 52.0 40.0 3.6 100.00 
Source: Calculated from data supplied to SPRU by the US Patent and Trademark Office. 
2.2 The Determinants of Technological Diversity 
We have suggested elsewhere (Pavitt, 1984; Pate1 and Pavitt, 1992) that two factors influence 
the degree of diversity of large firms' technological activities: 
1. Firm Size will be positively associated with technologically diversity, both as a 
consequence of successful product diversification in science-based technologies 
(chemicals and electrical~lectronics), and as an incentive to the application of 
production-based technologies in order to exploit economies of scale. We would 
therefore expect a positive association between firm size and technological diversity, 
measured as the number of technological fields in which the firm is active. 
2. Technology Intensity will also influence a firm's technological diversity. Increased 
intensity - measured as patenting per unit sales - will be positively associated with the 
of fields of competence, reflecting the results of more energetic technological search. 
3. Home country characteristics are also said to influence firms' degree of technological 
diversity. For example, it is argued that the competitive and institutional framework 
for Japanese firms leads them towards greater technological diversity than in other 
countries (see, for example, Kodama, 1986; and Oskarsson 1993). 
4. Finally, it can be argued that industry characteristics influence the number of fields in 
which the firm is active through the range of competencies required to develop and 
produce a given class of products. 
In Table 3, we present the results of our regressions testing the above explanations. The 
dependent variable is each firm's number of active fields of competence (out of a total of 34) 
in the 1980s; the independent variables are each firm's sales, patent intensity, country of 
origin and industry. The results show that the coefficients on size and technology intensity 
have the expected sign and are significant at the 5% level. On the other hand firms' countries 
of origin have no significant effects on the diversity of technological competencies, since the 
country dummy variables are not significant at the 5% level. Industries (i.e. product groups 
made) do matter, with food firms showing the least technological diversity and aircraft firms 
the most. 
Table 3. Determinants of Technological Diversification 
Dependent Variable: Number of Technical Fields (out of 34) of Patenting (81-90) 
Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error 
Constant 16.1 l* 0.34 15.16* 1.33 
Sales (1988) 0.25* 0.02 0.25* 0.02 
Patent Intensity (1988) 0.02* 0.00 0.02* 0.00 
Dummy Japan -0.95 0.55 
Dummy USA 0.45 0.48 
Dummy Chemicals 2.98* 1.39 
Dummy Pharmaceuticals -1.46 1.54 
Dummy Mining & Petroleum 1.98 1.5 1 
Dummy Rubber & Plastics 0.2 1 1.87 
Dummy Paper & Wood -1.89 1.61 
Dummy Food -3.9 1 * 1.70 
Dummy Drink & Tobacco -1.22 1.94 
Dummy Building Materials 1.71 1.65 
Dummy Metals 1.84 1.45 
Dummy Machinery 1.06 1.40 
Dummy Electrical 2.62 1.42 
Dummy Computers -1.26 1.63 
Dummy Instruments -1.61 1.68 
Dummy Motor Vehicles -0.56 1.49 
Dummy Aircraft 4.37* 1.62 
* Indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
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2.3 Changing Technological Diversity over Time 
Not only are large firms technologically diverse, but their diversity has been changing over 
time. This is confirmed in Table 4, which shows the numbers of firms (from Europe, Japan 
and the USA) whose technological diversity increased, decreased and remained stable over 
this period. It emerges clearly that firms differ markedly according to their country of origin, 
with most Japanese firms increasing the technological diversity of their patenting activities, 
and a majority of European firms doing likewise, whilst most US firms decreased the 
diversity of their patenting. At the sectoral level, technological diversity increased in US 
firms in pharmaceuticals, computers and drink and tobacco, and in European firms in 
chemical and machinery related sectors. 
Table 4. Changes in Firms' Technological Diversity by Product Group and Region: 
1969-74 to 1985-90. 
Number of Firnzs 
USA Europe Japan Total 
Dec Stab Inc Dec Stab Inc Dec Stab Inc Dec Stab Inc 
Chemicals 23 0  3  3  2  10 0  1  23 26 3  36 
Pharmaceuticals 3 3 8  2  0  5  0 0 4  5  3  17 
Mining & Petroleum 10 1  5  2  1 8  0 1 3  12 3  16 
Textiles etc. 3 2 1  1 1 1  0 0 4  4  3  6  
Rubber & Plastics 5 0 0  3 0 0  0  0  2  8 0 2  
Paper & Wood 7 1 5  1 0 2  0 0 1  8 1 8  
Food 8 2 2  0 0 1  0  1 2  8 3 5  
Drink & Tobacco 2 2 3  1 0 2  0 0 1  3 2 6  
Building Materials 7 1 1  3 0 1  0 0 4  10 1 6  
Metals 8 3 4  7  3  9  0  0  10 15 6  23 
Machinery 20 2  8  7  1  12 1  0  11 28 3  31 
Electrical 16 4  7  5 3 4  0  0  17 21 7  28 
Computers 5 0 5  1 1 2  0 0 2  6  1 9  
Instruments 6 2 3  0 1 0  2 0 5  8  3  8  
Motor Vehicles 6 0 4  5 1 9  0  0  12 11 1  25 
Aircraft 10 0  2  2 0 5  0  0  0  12 0  7  
All Product Groups 139 23 61 43 14 72 3  3  101 185 40 234 
Dec: Firms where there has been a decrease in the number of technical fields (out of 34) of activity. 
Stab: Firms where there has been no change in the number of technical fields (out of 34) of activity. 
Inc: Firms where there has been an increase in the number of technical fields (out of 34) of activity. 
The meaning of these trends is ambiguous. It is tempting to conclude that the declining 
technological diversity of US firms reflects their declining technological competitiveness, 
compared to firms from Japan and Europe13. However, the data for US firms reflect domestic 
patenting, the scope of which is sensitive to its cost; whilst the data for European and 
Japanese firms also reflect international patenting, the scope of which reflects international 
l 3  Since the late 1960s, business-funded R & D has increased more rapidly in Japan than in Europe, and more 
rapidly in Europe than in the USA. See Patel and Pavitt, 1994a. 
technological competitiveness and business strategy. The trends could therefore simply 
reflect increases in the cost of US patenting (influencing US firms), and the processes of 
technological catch-up (influencing European and Japanese firms). Suffice to say that, by the 
1980s, our US firms were in aggregate still slightly more diversified (according to the same 
measure as in Table 2) than the European and Japanese firms. 
Table 5. Changes in the Number of firms that are Active in 34 Technical Fields, by 
Region: 1969-74 to 1985-90. 
Sorted bv total change 
1985-90 Change Since 1969-74 
WE JP US Total WE JP US Total 
Calculators & Computers, etc. 74 69 142 285 14 34 22 70 
Drugs & Bioengineering 
Materials (inc glass & ceramics) 
Plastic & rubber products 
General Electrical Ind. Apparatus 
Instruments & controls 
Metallurgical & Metal Treatment proc. 
Dentistry & Surgery 
Miscellaneous metal products 
Other - (Ammunitions & weapons, etc.) 
Image & sound equipment 
Chemical Processes 
Mining & wells: mach. & proc. 
Hydrocarbons, mineral oils, fuels etc. 
General Non-electrical Ind. Equip. 
Agricultural Chemicals 
Semiconductors 
Photography & photocopy 
App. for chemicals, food, glass etc. 
Assembling & material handling app. 
Road vehicles & engines 
Electrical devices & systems 
Organic Chemicals 




Metallurgical & metal working equip. 
Telecommunications 
Bleaching Dyeing & Disinfecting 
Other transport equip. (exc. aircraft) 
Food & Tobacco (proc. & prod.) 
Induced Nuclear Reactions 
Textile, clothing, leather, wood products 
WE denotes European Firms. 
Stronger conclusions can be reached about the technical fields into (and out of) which firms 
are moving over time. Table 5 shows the total number of large firms that have been active in 
each of our 34 technical fields in 1985-90 and the changes therein since 1969-74. It thereby 
compares the degree of pervasiveness of technological competencies in different fields, and 
how this has changed over time. The technological fields are sorted according to the last 
column, namely, the change in the number of active firms between the two periods. It 
emerges that: 
for firms from Japan, Europe and the USA, the most pervasive competencies are the 
same: instrumentation and control, production machinery and chemical processes, in 
all of which the overwhelming majority of our firms was technologically active; 
the least pervasive competencies were in nuclear energy, aircraft and textiles; 
over time, the sectors in which the number of firms with competencies increased most 
rapidly were computing, drugs and bio-engineering, and materials; 
the patterns and trends were similar in all three regions, except for a particularly sharp 
decline in US firms with competencies in image and sound, and in photography and 
photocopy. 
2.4 Some Implications of "Multi-technology" Firms 
Our results are consistent with the conclusions of research by Ove Granstrand and his 
colleagues at Chalmers in Swedenl4. In particular, large firms and the products they make 
depend on many fields of technological competence, the number of which is changing over 
time with the widening range of technological opportunities emerging from improvement in 
computing and other science-based technologies. In order to assimilate this range of 
emerging technologies, large firms simultaneously increase their internal competencies, form 
alliances with external sources, and increase their overall R & D expenditures. 
At the same time, the striking technological diversity of our large firms casts some doubt on 
the feasibility of a "focused" technological - as distinct from product market - strategy 
(Porter, 1985), given that the products that they make are multi-technology (see Freeman, 
1982). Similarly, the notion of "core competencies" (see Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) in 
technological strategy is not entirely clear, when large firms are typically active so many 
technical fields. 
l 4  See, in particular, Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Granstrand et al., 1992; Jacobsson and Oskarsson (1994); 
Oskarsson, 1993. 
In this context, it is worth noting that business practitioners often have a more elaborate 
classification of firms' technological competencies. According to those in large firms that are 
members of the European Industrial Research Management Association (EIFWA): 
"In order to consider explicitly the technological resources needed to implement a 
strategic plan, it is essential to know the precise technological position of the company (or 
the business unit), in relation to that of its major competitors.. .... This can ....... be 
considered in terms of three types of technologies which show differing potential for 
competitive impact. 
+ Basic technologies - Widely available; low risk low reward. 
+ Key technologies - Proprietary; essential to maintain in-house; medium risk, 
medium reward. 
+ Pacing technologies - These can produce a breakthrough for the company: normally 
achieved by in-house effort over a long time; high risk, high reward." 
(EIFWA, 1986, p. 19) 
3 FROM FIRM-SPECIFIC COMPETENCIES TO PROFILES 
In this context, we shall now show that large firms have profiles of competencies, with levels 
of commitment and advantage that vary amongst technological fields. We shall also show 
that these profiles are highly stable, differentiated and strongly related to the product base. 
3.1 Defining and Measuring Firms' Technological Profiles 
Our definition of a firm's technological profile reflects both the experience of practitioners 
(see quote from EIRMA above) and the nature of our data base, as well as earlier 
contributions to the subject. We distinguish two interrelated dimensions of technological 
competencies. 
1. Core vs. Niche Competence reflects the relative importance of the field in the firm's 
total portfolio. It is measured as the share of the firm's patenting in each of our 34 
technical fields (PS). Relatively high shares will measure what we call a core 
competence, and relatively low shares a niche competence. 
2. Distinctive vs. Background Competence reflects the degree to which the firm has an 
advantage in the field compared to other firms. It is measured as the firm's share of 
total patenting in the field, divided by the firm's aggregate share in all fields. 
Elsewhere, we have called this the Revealed Technology Advantage (RTA) of the firm 
in each field. A high RTA will measure what we call a distinctive competence, and a 
low RTA what we call a background competence. 
We represent the full classification in Figure 1 below, showing that firms can have four 
categories of technological competence (in addition to having no competence of any kind in 
some fields). The following properties are of particular importance. 
Some categories are more important than others - in particular, core-distinctive is more 
important than niche-background. 
Given their definition, the measures along the two axes are correlated, and the 
correlation would be perfect, if there were an equal volume of total patenting in all 34 
technical fields. 
However, there are technical fields with relatively low levels of total patenting activity, 
where firms may develop a niche-distinctive competence. 
There are also technical fields with relatively high levels of patenting activity, where 
many firms have a core-background competence that is very similar to what European 
practitioners call basic technologies1? Our own earlier analysis shows that large firms 
find it necessary to maintain some in-house competence in basic (background) 
technologies, that are often related to production techniques and located in fields of 
mechanical, chemical and instrumentation engineering (Pate1 and Pavitt, 1994b. See 
also Table 5 above). 
The positioning of the axes on Figure 1 is (inevitably) arbitrary. We have placed the 
line between core and niche at the share that would allow equal distribution across all 
fields: 100134 = 3%. We have defined the difference between distinctive and 
background (and the cut-off for the latter) more pragmatically, after examining the 
profiles of a number of firms. 
Core 
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Figure 1: A Classification for Firms' Technological Profiles 
I s  Available not only within large firms, but also in smaller, specialised firms to whom large firms sometimes 
"spin-off their innovations (Rosenberg, 1976; von Hippel, 1988). 
In Figure 2 below, we reproduce the technological profiles of three large (and well-known) 
firms, from the chemical electrical and automobiles industries'b. A number of features of 
firms' profiles emerge from Figure 2. 
A relatively large number of technological fields combine to define each firm's 
technological profile: 11 in chemicals, 18 in electrical, and 20 in automobiles. 
In all three firms, these sectors account for more than 90% of the firms' patenting. 
The core distinctive competencies are very different: 
- chemicals: organic and agricultural chemicals, pharmaceuticals and photography; 
- electrical: computers, semiconductors, and image and sound; 
- automobiles: vehicles, engines and other transport. 
All three firms have at least one niche-distinctive competence; 
The chemical firm has just one core-background competence (chemical processes) 
accounting for 7% of all its patenting. 
The electrical and automobile firms are very different, with respectively 8 and 10 core 
background competencies, accounting for 47% of all patenting in the electrical firm, 
and 64% in the automobile firm. In both cases, instrumentation accounted for about 
15% of all patenting activities. 
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Figure 2a. Technological Profile of a Chemical Company 
l 6  Since we are (amongst other things) interested in illustrating differences amongst firms from different 
industries, the RTAs are calculated on the basis of patenting by firms from all sectors. For competitor analysis, 
they should probably be calculated on the basis of competitor firms only. 
Figure 2b. Technological Profile of an Electrical Company 
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On the basis of these examples, we may provisionally conclude that the classification of 
technological profiles proposed in Figure 1 has three potential strengths. 
$r%\dlurg 
.Aircrafl 
1. It encompasses the wide variety of technological competencies accumulated within 
large firms. 
2. It distinguishes the differing contributions of each field of competence. 
3. It highlights the importance of the core background competencies that are often 
neglected or ignored in conventional analysis. 
We shall now show that large firm's technological profiles have two other characteristics: 
they are both highly stable and highly differentiated. 
3.2 The Strong Stability of Firms' Technological Profiles and Directions of Search 
For nearly all our firms, these technological profiles are remarkably stable over time. For 
each firm, we correlated both the patent shares (PS) and the RTAs for the periods 1969-74 
and 1985-90. Table 6 shows that according to both measures, the overwhelming majority 
(more than 90%) of firms have profiles of technological competence that are statistically 
similar between 1969-74 and 1985-90, at the 1% level of significanceI7. Large firms clearly 
do not shift around rapidly in their fields of technological competencelg. 
Table 6. Stability of Technological Profiles Across 34 Technical Fields: 1969-74 to 
1985-90. 
Revealed Technology 
Patent Shares Advantage 
No. of Not Sig Sig at Sig at Not Sig Not Sig Not Sig 
Firms at 5% 5% 1% at 5% at 5% at 1% 
1 Chemicals 65 1 1 63 5 7 53 
2 Pharmaceuticals 25 2 3 20 0 0 25 
3 Mining & Petroleum 3 1 7 7 17 5 5 2 1 
4 Textiles etc. 13 4 6 3 5 6 2 
5 Rubber & Plastics 10 0 0 10 1 1 8 
6 Paper & Wood 17 1 3 13 4 4 9 
7 Food 16 0 1 15 1 2 13 
8 Drink & Tobacco 11 0 1 10 0 2 9 
9 Building Materials 17 0 0 17 0 0 17 
10 Metals 44 4 6 3 4 5 7 32 
11 Machinery 63 2 5 5 6 5 10 48 
12 Electrical 5 6 4 5 47 5 8 43 
13 Computers 16 0 0 16 0 1 15 
14 Instruments 19 0 0 19 2 3 14 
15 Motor Vehicles 37 0 0 3 7 2 2 33 
16 Aircraft 19 0 0 19 1 1 17 
All Sectors 459 25 38 396 4 1 59 359 
l 7  No systematic differences in stability can be detected between firms in different sectors and countries. 
Given our method of compiling data of firm-level patenting, we cannot measure any changes in our firms' 
technological profiles resulting from acquisitions and divestments. On the basis of data for large Swedish firms, 
Oskarsson (1993) has concluded that acquisitions and divestments have had little influence on the shape of their 
technological profiles. 
This stability over time in firms' technological profiles is defined by relatively broad 
technological fields, and does not reflect the more detailed processes of search that firms 
undertake. For this reason, we have identified in US patenting activities the 1,000 (out of a 
total of around 100,000) technological sub-classes of the highest technological opportunity, as 
measured by their absolute increase in patenting from the 1960s to the late 1980s. In 
aggregate, their share increased steeply from 3 to 18% of total US patenting. A relatively 
high proportion of fast growing fields (FGFs) are to be found in electronics and chemical 
technol~gies'~. 
In Table 7, we show that firms are in fact heavily constrained by their prior competencies in 
the directions in which they accumulate competencies in these fast-growing fields. Their 
shares of total fast-growing patenting in 1985-90 within the five broad fields of technology 
used in Table 1 - chemicals, mechanical, electrical~lectronic, transport and "other" - are 
strongly and positively correlated with their prior shares of total patenting in these same fields 
over the period 1969-84. In other words, firms' capacities to exploit fields of high 
technological opportunity are strongly constrained by their prior competencies. 
Table 7. Correlations of Past (1969-84) Shares of Total Patenting on Shares of 
Patenting in Fast-Growing Areas in 1985-90. 
Shares of Patenting in Fast-Growing Areas in 85-90 
Chemicals Mechanical Electrical Transport Other 
Share of Total Chem 69-84 0.9 1 * -0.4 1 * -0.6 1 * -0.26" 0.00 
Share of Total Mech 69-84 -0.4 1 * 0.68" -0. lo* 0.14" 0.09" 
Share of Total Elec 69-84 -0.58" -0.12" 0.87" -0.17" -0.17" 
Share of Total Trans 69-84 -0.34" 0.18" -0.13" 0.85" -0.04 
Share of Total Othe 69-84 0.06 -0.12" -0.18" -0.07 0.55" 
* Denotes a coefficient significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
3.3 The Differentiation of Industries' Technological Competencies 
In addition to being very stable, our data also show that large firms' technological 
competencies are highly differentiated. To begin with, average patent shares and RTAs for 
each of our sixteen industries (i.e. aggregate data based on our firms) are in general very 
different. For patent shares, 23% of the cross-industry correlations are positive and 
significant20; and for RTAs the share is reduced to 5%. In both cases, there are essentially 
three clusters: 
l 9  For this reason, we find significant correlations between firms' share of total patenting in fast-growing fields, 
on the one hand, and their R & D intensity and share of total patenting in science based technologies, on the 
other. 
'O At the 5% level. 
the chemical and chemical-related industries (the first eight listed in Table 1); 
machinery and vehicles; 
electrical and computers. 
There is also one significantly negative correlation that is important: between the RTAs of 
firms in chemicals and in electrical products. Although both are often lumped together as 
"high technology" or "science- based" firms, they are clearly based on very different mixes of 
technological competence. 
The statistical similarities and (above all) differences described above reflect similarities and 
differences in core and distinctive competencies amongst firms in different sectors. These are 
set out systematically in Table 8 which describes the contribution of competencies in our 34 
technical fields to firms in each of the 16 sectors according to the four-fold classification 
shown in Figure 1. 
From Table 8 it emerges that technical fields vary greatly in the nature and extent of their 
contributions to firm-specific competencies: 
organic chemicals and materials are core distinctive competencies in five industries; 
drugs, non-electrical machinery, and image and sound in three each; instruments (in 
spite of its overall importance) in only one; and five fields in none at all; 
as can be anticipated from Table 5, core background competencies are located mainly 
in chemical processes, machinery, instrumentation, and organic chemicals; 
niche distinctive competencies are restricted to relatively few fields such as plastics, 
dyestuffs, nuclear energy and power plant; 
the most prevalent of niche-background technologies are assembly and materials 
handling, plastic and rubber, and metallurgical processes; 
in spite of its spread amongst an increasing number of companies, computer 
competence is so far identifiable beyond the usual "high-tech" industries only in 
machinery and vehicles. 
It also emerges from Table 8 that profiles of competencies vary greatly amongst firms in the 
different sectors: 
the number of technical fields involved varies from 7 in pharmaceuticals to 24 in 
aircraft; 
in only four sectors (chemicals, pharmaceuticals, petroleum and mining and electrical 
products) do the number of core distinctive technological fields outnumber the number 
of core background fields; 

a in at least six sectors, core background fields account for more than 50% of all 
technological competencies. 
3.4 Do Firms' Technological Profiles match Product Groups? 
One drawback in our analysis so far is that it neglects the possibility of diversity in the profile 
of technological competencies of firms within each industrial sector. For this reason, we 
summarise in Tables 9 and 10 of our systematic examination of the similarities and 
differences in profiles of technological competencies individually for all our large firms. 
Each table shows the percentage of firms' technological profiles, for the period 1981-90, that 
are similar (that is - positively correlated at the 5 % level) to firms inside the same product 
group, and to those in the other product groups; Table 9 does this for patent shares, and Table 
10 for Revealed Technology Advantage. The main patterns that emerge are as follows. 
a Firms have significantly different profiles of technological competence to most others: 
19 % are similar in patent shares (i.e. core competencies), and 1 1 % in RTAs (i.e. 
distinctive competencies). 
More generally, firms are more similar (or less dissimilar) to each other in their core 
than their distinctive competencies. 
In all sectors, firms have a higher probability of finding others with similar 
technological profiles within their sector than outside: from three times as high for 
machinery firms (according to RTAs), to more than fourteen times as high for 
pharmaceutical firms. 
The frequency of technological proximity between firms in different sectors is not 
evenly spread or random, but reveals distinct groupings, many of which have been 
anticipated earlier in Table 8: in particular, those with competencies in organic 
chemicals, in electronics, and in production machinery. 
These sectoral similarities and differences amongst firms in the sources and directions 
of technological accumulation are broadly consistent with a sectoral taxonomy of 
technical change proposed earlier by one of us (Pavitt, 1984): 
- two distinct science-based sectors centred on organic chemistry (chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, petro-chemicals), and on physics-based technology (electrical, 
computers); 
- machinery suppliers with areas of specialisation influenced by major users; 
- a range of scale intensive sectors with production technologies dependent on 
improvements in chemical processes, instrumentation and production machinery. 
Table 9. Correlations of Firms' Shares across 34 Technical Fields, by Principal Product Group: 1981-90. 
Percentage of the total that are Positive and Significant at 5% level. 
Own All Other 
PPG PPG's Phar Mini Text Rubb Pape Food Drin Buil Meta Mach Elec Comp Inst Moto Airc 
Chemicals 78.6 19.1 60.3 61.8 53.6 49.0 17.8 39.0 9.8 24.9 19.1 4.5 1.7 0.0 8.7 2.4 1.9 
Pharmaceuticals 
Mining & Petroleum 
Textiles etc. 
Rubber & Plastics 
Paper & Wood 
Food 









Table 10. Correlations of Firms' RTA's across 34 Technical Fields, by Principal Product Group: 1981-90. 
Percentage of the total that are Positive and Significant at 5% level. 
Own All Other 
PPG PPG's Phar Mini Text Rubb Pape Food Drin Buil Meta Mach Elec Comp Inst Moto Airc 
Chemicals 48.7 9.6 26.1 25.2 33.6 26.6 12.0 6.4 2.7 19.1 14.5 3.8 1.3 0.0 2.5 0.8 0.9 
Pharmaceuticals 86.7 6.2 3.1 16.8 0.9 3.8 20.6 13.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 
Mining & Petroleum 72.9 7.4 4.2 7.5 9.7 0.2 0.0 4.6 14.2 3.6 0.6 0.0 1.1 1.8 2.9 
Textiles etc. 46.7 12.4 33.3 23.3 10.0 10.0 38.1 10.8 4.5 4.8 0.0 3.3 0.3 0.0 
Rubber & Plastics 86.1 9.0 17.3 0.0 11.1 18.1 1.5 9.0 2.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 9.3 
Paper & Wood 37.3 7.9 11.9 22.2 29.9 1.6 9.2 2.8 0.7 6.3 1.4 0.0 
Food 100.0 5.2 87.5 6.3 0.8 1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Drink & Tobacco 82.1 6.9 10.2 2.0 5.8 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 
Building Materials 52.5 9.6 10.5 10.0 3.9 0.0 6.0 2.1 1.0 
Metals 77.8 7.2 11.4 5.1 0.0 0.9 3.8 3.2 
Machinery 21.3 7.4 5.8 2.0 3.1 27.1 7.6 
w 
w Electrical 45.5 5.7 47.4 15.3 3.6 5.5 
Computers 99.3 7.6 16.5 0.0 3.9 
Instruments 38.1 4.9 1.8 3.7 
Motor Vehicles 75.6 5.7 8.6 
Aircraft 76.5 3.7 
4 COMPETENCIES AND MANAGERIAL CHOICE: 
THE EFFECTS OF PRODUCT MIX AND HOME COUNTRY 
It is already clear from the above analysis that managerial choice is constrained by firm's size 
and product mix. In particular, we have shown that: 
large firms are generally technologically diversified, and slowly changing over time , 
as the range of technological opportunities increases; 
however, each firm's profile of technological competencies remains very stable, and is 
strongly constrained by the products it makes; 
similarly, each firm's direction of technological search (and accumulation of 
competence) is strongly constrained by its prior competencies. 
In other words, a firm's existing product mix and associated competencies strongly constrain 
the directions in which it seeks to exploit technological opportunities and acquire competence. 
We shall now extend these analyses to explore the determinants, not of the direction, but of 
the rate of the firm's technological search activities. We suggest that three factors will 
influence the rate of search. 
1. The firm's home country will influence its rate of technological accumulation through 
the nationally-based supply and demand-side inducement mechanisms described by 
Porter (1990). These are likely to remain strong since, globalisation of markets and 
other things notwithstanding, large firms continue to perform the overwhelming 
proportion of their R & D activities (-90%) in their home countries (Pate1 and Pavitt, 
1991; Patel, 1994). 
2. The firm's sector of activity will influence its rate of technological accumulation. 
Given that the firm's competencies and directions of search are determined in large 
part by what it produces, and that technological opportunities are unequal across fields, 
firms will have varying capacities to exploit opportunities, and thereby varying rates of 
accumulation (Malerba, 1992). 
3. Firm-specific factors will also influence the rate of technological accumulation. Given 
uncertainties, different managements will make different bets. Also, the professional 
background of managers, and their associated "rules of thumb" and professional 
loyalties, may influence the propensity to encourage technological accumulation21. 
In Table 11, we present the results of our analysis of the effects of home country conditions 
and of product mix (both measured through the appropriate aggregate indicators from our 
2 1  See, for example, Scherer and Huh (1992) and Bosworth and Wilson (1992), who have shown that, in the 
USA and the UK, the level of firms' allocation of resources to technological activities is positively associated 
with the presence of graduate scientists and engineers in top management. 
large firm database) on various measures of the rate of accumulation of technological 
competencies in firms. From this it emerges that: 
both home country and product mix have a statistically significant influence on the rate 
of technological accumulation, whether measured in terms of patent per unit of sales, 
growth in patent share, or share of total patenting in fast-growing fields; 
the unexplained variance amongst firms nonetheless remains considerable - 56-80% 
of the total, which suggests that company-specific factors - and particularly those 
influencing the volume of resources allocated to technological accumulation - remain 
important22. 
Table 11. Factors Influencing Firms' Rate of Technological Accumulation. 
Patent Intensity: Change in Patent Share: Share of Patents in F-G: 
1985-90 1969-74 to 1985-90 1985-90 
Dependent Variable Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error Coeff. Std Error 
Constant -32.08* 10.90 0.83 0.52 -6.7 1 * 1.69 
Industry Average 1.03* 0.07 1.88* 0.42 0.82* 0.05 
Country Average 0.62* 0.16 0.68* 0.07 0.38* 0.07 
* Denotes Coefficient Significantly Different from zero at the 5% level. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The substantive findings of our paper are surnrnarised at its beginning. We shall now explore 
their implications for policy, theory and the agenda for future research. 
5.1 For Corporate Policy 
Our results confirm and sometimes clarify some prescriptions on technology strategy in large 
firms, whilst casting doubt on others. 
The Strong Constraints on Feasible Choice. Perhaps most important, we have identified a 
number of important constraints on the strategies for technological competence-building in 
large firms. 
22 Since all three dependent variables are based on patenting, part of the unexplained variance may reflect inter- 
firm differences in the propensity to patent the results of R & D and related technological activities. However, 
this is less likely to operate in shares of total patenting in fast-growing fields, where more than 55% of inter-firm 
variance still remains to be explained. 
Their technological strategies can only rarely be "focused", since the products they 
develop and make require the integration of knowledge from a range of technological 
fields (see also Freeman, 1982). 
Their competence to exploit specific technological opportunities is highly 
differentiated, and heavily dependent on past competencies accumulated through 
making specific classes of products. 
Their capacity to modify their profiles of technological competence is limited, and 
takes a long time (see also Rosenbloom and Cusumano, 1987). 
In addition to these constraints on the directions of technological accumulation, both 
home-country and industry characteristics have a significant influence on the firm's 
rate of competence accumulation, although the unexplained variance suggests 
considerable scope for managerial discretion. 
The Nature of Competencies. We have also shown that the simple concept of "core 
competence" cannot encompass the range and variety of technology profiles found in large 
firms. Our four-fold classification shows that large firms also accumulate background - and 
manly production-related - competencies, the importance of which can sometimes outweigh 
distinctive competencies. This variety of inputs into large firms' competencies has other 
important consequences that we shall now explore. 
Technology Fusion. The growing spread of firms' technological competencies in computing, 
biotech and materials must be seen in the context of the widespread and continuing 
importance of competencies in mechanical, chemical and instrumentation engineering. As 
Kodama (1986) has pointed out, effective innovation often requires the combined 
development of well-established and new technological fields, and takes considerable time, 
which is why firms' technological profiles change only slowly, and why the implementation 
of corporate technology strategy requires the effective integration of firm-specific-knowledge 
across a range of fields (see, for example, Henderson and Cockburn, 1993). 
Competence-Destroying Innovations? It is also why "competence-destroying" innovations 
are less likely in large firms with diversified competencies and R & D programmes (Cooper 
and Schendel, 1976; Tushman and Anderson, 1987; Utterback and Suarez,1993). Although 
radical breakthroughs may destroy one part of such a firm's competence, it is unlikely to 
destroy them all. This can be seen in the new biotechnology, where - in spite of a slow start - 
established chemical and pharmaceutical firms have succeeded in combining the radical 
breakthroughs with their established fields of competence (Arora and Gambardella, 1992; 
Galimberti, 1993). 
"Technological Leap-frogging"? Similarly, the multi-technology nature of many products 
reduces possibilities for "technological leap-frogging" by developing countries. Perez and 
Soete (1988) have suggested that radical new technologies open opportunities for late-comer 
countries and companies to by-pass (or "leapfrog") earlier paths of technological 
accumulation, and to enter new product areas with greater dynamism than more advanced 
countries and companies more firmly embedded in older paths of technological development. 
However, when new technologies must be combined or "fused" with older ones, the earlier 
paths of technological accumulation cannot be avoided. This remains the case in many 
sectors of central importance to economic development, including the electronics sector in 
East Asia, which depends heavily on technological competence in production engineering 
(Bell, 1984; Hobday, 1993). 
External Strategic Alliances as Complements to In-house Competence-Building. Finally, 
we should note that the technological fields where firms have been acquiring an in-house 
capability most vigorously since the early 1970s - computers, biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, and materials (see Table 5) - are also those where firms have increased most 
vigorously their external alliances for technological exchanges and joint developments (see 
Mowery, 1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1992). This suggests - as Granstrand and his 
colleagues have noted in micro-studies (1992) - that external alliances are complements to 
internal learning, and not substitutes. 
5.2 For Theory 
Complexity and Path-dependency. The variety, stability and differentiation of large firms' 
technological competencies, their close links to the products that they make, and the localised 
nature of their technological search, all confirm the importance of technological (and other) 
complexity in: 
constraining firms' processes of technological search (see, for example, David, 1975); 
allowing firms to differentiate themselves to explore and master different zones of 
technological complexity; 
explaining why the assimilation of radical new technology takes a long time. 
Technological Relatedness rather than Economies of Scope. They also suggest the need 
for a more refined notion of "economies of scope" that allows them to be partial rather than 
complete. For example, our analysis in Table 7 shows virtually no competence-based 
economies of scope between chemicals and computers, but a much higher probability of their 
existence between chemicals and pharmaceutical products. A chemical firm would therefore 
have partial economies of scope, ( in that it would probably still need to invest in certain 
complementary fields of competence in order to enter pharmaceuticals) whereas in computers 
it would be starting from scratch. In fact, the earlier concept of "technological relatedness" 
(Rumelt, 1974) is analytically and operationally more useful, especially now that it can be 
measured directly. 
Explaining the Core - rather than the Boundaries - of the Firm. Our analysis suggests 
that notions of firm-specific dynamic competencies provide a convincing empirical - and 
competence-based - explanation of the core (not the boundaries) of the firm (Dosi et al., 
1992). In particular, our results in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that we are able to claim the 
following: "Show us a firms' profile of technological competencies, and we shall probably be 
able to predict the range of products it makes, and almost certainly be able to predict what it 
does not make". 
What Type of Variety? "Variety" is an often used term in evolutionary economics23. Our 
analysis shows various possible definitions of the term, each of which should be carefully 
distinguished in any general scheme of things: 
Variety within firms in the technological competencies that they embody; 
Variety between firms in their mix (or profile) of technological competencies, largely 
defined by the products they develop and make. 
a Once given their profile of competencies and product mix, lack of variety in 
managerial decisions about their directions of search, but considerable variety in 
decisions about their rate of search. 
5.3 For Future Research 
Technology and Firm Performance. Continuing improvements in information technology 
and firm-level data bases are opening considerable possibilities for econometric explorations 
of the influence of technological activities on the performance of individual firms. Beyond 
standard cross-sectional studies, attention should be paid to: 
the effects of the level and field of education of management and the work force. 
These could influence both the nature of decisions about the allocation of resources to 
technology made under uncertainly, and the speed of learning (Bosworth and Wilson, 
1992; Scherer and Huh, 1992; Prais, 1993; Pavitt and Patel, 1988) 
the dynamic interactions between technological activities, product diversification and 
performance. 
23 See, for example, Metcalfe and Gibbons (1989). 
Corporate Strategy and Technology Management. Qualitative studies (historical and case- 
based) will also be necessary to understand the dynamics of competence building and 
exploitation in large firms. In particular: 
the dynamic interactions in competence-accumulation amongst technologies, 
components, sub-systems and products (see, for example, Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Miyazaki, 1994); 
the organisational implications of different technologies and types of innovation (see, 
for example, Coombs and Richards, 199 1 ; Tidd, 1993); 
the problems of corporate technology strategy in the firm that is multi-product, multi- 
divisional, and multi-technology (see, for example, Chandler, 199 1, 1992); 
the problems of defining corporate competencies ex ante rather than ex post. 
A Red Herring. We should also avoid trying to answer unanswerable questions, such as why 
particular firms choose to combine particular technologies in particular ways to make 
particular products, from amongst the (almost) infinity of mathematical possibilities that do 
exist. As in nature, firms evolve in a complex and path dependent world, where history 
matters. If Darwin and DNA cannot model and predict the emergence and existence of the 
elephant and the mouse, we should not be expected to do the equivalent in explaining why 
industries are what they are and not something else. 
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